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TENDER OFFER MANIPULATION: TACTICS
AND STRATEGIES AFTER MARATHON
by
Robert A. Profusek*
"When I use the word, " Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less. "
"The question is, "said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many diferent things. "
"The question is, " said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-
that's all. "
L. Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass
HE tactics and strategies and, therefore, the legal considerations re-
lating to unsolicited takeover bids have predominantly been
designed and continually reshaped around the applicable stateI and
federal regulatory frameworks since the enactment of the Williams Act in
1968.2 The approximately two-year period following the 1979 overhaul of
the rules implementing the Williams Act 3 by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has been no exception. That period witnessed a
* B.A., Cornell University; J.D., New York University. The author is a member of
the Dallas office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
I. For more than a decade, state takeover legislation was an important aspect of the
structuring of almost any nationwide tender offer. See generally Shapiro, State Takeover
Laws, 12 INST. ON SEC. REG. 401 (1980); 606 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) F-I (June 3, 1981).
The constitutional assault on these laws initially received a mixed response from the courts.
Compare Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho takeover
statute invalid on supremacy and commerce clause grounds), rev'd on venue grounds sub
nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979), with AMCA Int'l Corp. v.
Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio takeover statute upheld against supremacy
and commerce clause challenges). The assault recently culminated in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
102 S. Ct. 2629, 73 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1982). In MITE a majority of the Supreme Court held
that the Illinois takeover statute imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
While certain features of the Illinois statute distinguish it from other state takeover laws
(e.g., the Illinois statute provided for administrative review of the substantive fairness of
tender offers subject to the statute), MITE may sound a death knell for virtually all state
takeover legislation, at least as presently constituted. See generally Hanna Mining Co. v.
Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. C82-959 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1981) (pre-MITE decision
adumbrating MITE's analysis in holding that "penalty box" provision of Ohio Takeover
Act, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 1(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1981), was unconstitutional under
commerce clause). In some part due to Justice Powell's concurrence in MITE (joining in the
commerce clause ruling so as to permit the states room to legislate in the area), however,
efforts have begun in a number of states to enact legislation that would withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(g), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158 (Nov. 29, 1979), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373.
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proliferation of new tender offer tactics and strategies, which in significant
part culminated in the battle between Mobil Corporation and United
States Steel Corporation for control of Marathon Oil Company, and in the
seemingly inevitable stockholders' litigation that resulted.4
This Article principally focuses upon the implications of litigation in
which Mobil challenged asset and stock options granted by Marathon to
U.S. Steel to induce the latter to make a competing offer, some 50% higher
than Mobil's unsolicited bid, which Marathon's directors had rejected as
"grossly inadequate."' 5 Mobil's challenge was essentially two-pronged: 6 it
alleged that (1) the granting of the options constituted a violation of the
Marathon directors' state law fiduciary duties;7 and (2) the options were
"manipulative" under section 14(e) of the Williams Act. 8 After a four-day
hearing on Mobil's application for a preliminary injunction, the trial court
held that the challenged options were granted for a good faith business
purpose (solicitation of a fair competing bid), and that the exercise price
under each option was fair to Marathon's shareholders. 9 Mobil, therefore,
failed to make the required showing of likelihood of success on the mer-
its.10 The trial court also held that the options could not be manipulative
4. In the interest of full disclosure, the author's firm, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue,
acted as counsel for Marathon in connection with the Mobil/U.S. Steel/Marathon takeover
battle and the stockholders' litigation resulting therefrom. The same firm also acted as
counsel in the takeover bid by Norcen Energy Resources Limited for control of The Hanna
Mining Company. See infra text accompanying notes 165-72. The views expressed herein
are, of course, solely those of the author.
5. Marathon Oil Co. Statement on Schedule 14D-9, at 3 (Nov. 2, 1981).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 86-92. In addition to the breach of fiduciary duty
and Williams Act theories, Mobil argued that the options granted to U.S. Steel were ultra
vires and that the asset option constituted a sale of "substantially all" of Marathon's assets,
thus allegedly requiring shareholder approval under OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (Page
1978). See Complaint 34-47, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 1402 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Complaint]. These allegations were not actively pursued
in the hearing on Mobil's application for a preliminary injunction and were given short
shrift by the trial court. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,375 (S.D. Ohio), rey'd on other grounds, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Marathon].
7. See Complaint, supra note 6, 30-34.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); see Complaint, supra note 6, 11 24-29. Section 14(e) pro-
vides, in part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for ten-
ders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any
such offer, request or solicitation.
9. Marathon, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 98,375, at
92,285.
10. Id The trial court held (and the appellate court confirmed) that the standard for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction in the Sixth Circuit was the traditional four-pronged
test articulated in cases such as Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261
(6th Cir. 1977):
[In considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a trial court must
consider the following factors:]
1) Whether the plaintiff has shown a strong or substantial likelihood or
probability of success on the merits;
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under section 14(e), because their existence and terms had been fully dis-
closed." In a decision that, at the very least, came as a surprise to most
members of the securities bar,' 2 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the latter ruling and held that the options were "manipulative"
under section 14(e) because they prevented other tender offer participants
from "competing on a par. . . for control" of the subject company.13
This Article endeavors to analyze the principal legal and strategic impli-
cations of the Marathon concept of manipulation in the tender offer con-
text. While the most obvious implications relate to the analysis of the
legality of defensive measures implemented by the target or subject com-
pany, the Marathon holding may be most important in litigation instituted
by the target against an unwanted bidder. Nonetheless, before Marathon
and its implications can be properly analyzed, the legal and strategic stage
upon which the case unfolded must be set forth so that its events can be
considered in their proper context.
I. THE MARATHON SETTING
A. On Offense
1. The SEC's 1979 Rules and the Demise of the State Takeover Laws. In
late 1979, after a series of false starts, 14 the SEC implemented a major
overhaul of the regulatory system under the Williams Act that was primar-
ily designed to ensure prompt dissemination of and full disclosure relating
to tender offers subject to the Act.15 Some of the new rules favor subject
2) Whether the plaintiff has shown irreparable injury;
3) Whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial
harm to others; [and]
4) Whether the public interest would be served by issuing the preliminary
injunction.
Marathon, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,275. A
number of courts have relaxed the test for the issuance of preliminary injunctions in the
tender offer context based upon a standard requiring the plaintiff to show either (1) probable
success on the merits and possible irreparable injury or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in the plaintiffs favor. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill,
Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 871 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Alaska Interstate Co. v.
McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532, 540 (D. Del. 1975); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366
F. Supp. 374, 403 (S.D. Tex. 1973). The more relaxed standard has been held to be consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's emphasis upon the applicability of "traditional equitable
principles" in Williams Act litigation in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57-
60 (1975). See, e.g., Sea World, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,803, at 90,912 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
11. Marathon, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at
92,285.
12. Nathan, Novel Legal Questions Explored, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 25, col. 4;
Bialkin, Court Casts Cloud over Option Tactic in Takeovers, Legal Times of Washington,
Jan. 11, 1982, at 19, col. 1.
13. Marathon, 669 F.2d at 375.
14. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,676 (Aug. 6, 1976), 41 Fed.
Reg. 33,004; SEC Securities Act Release No. 5538 (Nov. 5, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 41,223; SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5529 (Sept. 9, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 33,035.
15. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158 (Nov. 29, 1979), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373.
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companies. For example, rule 14d-716 extends the minimum period during
which the bidder must permit tendered shares to be withdrawn if desired
by target shareholders to fifteen business days after the date of commence-
ment of a takeover bid (plus ten additional business days following a com-
peting bid); rule 14e-l(a) imposes a minimum offering period of twenty
business days after commencement.1 7 Consistent, however, with most
practitioners' perceptions of the SEC's biases in this area, the new rules on
balance tend to favor bidders over subject companies. Thus, notwith-
standing the substantial question of whether it had the power to do so, 18
the SEC adopted rule 14d-5, which provides bidders an almost unfettered
right to a subject company's shareholder list and security position listing. 19
More importantly, on the stated ground that "pre-commencement public
announcements cause security holders to make investment decisions with
respect to a tender offer on the basis of incomplete information and trigger
market activity normally attendant to a tender offer,"20 the SEC adopted
rule 14d-2(b), 21 which requires the actual dissemination of a tender offer
within five business days of the public announcement of its material
terms. 22 The immediate casualty was the preoffer waiting period require-
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1981).
17. Id § 240.14e- 1(a). The 20 business day offering requirement of rule 14e- 1(a) is less
significant from the subject company's perspective, because it only prescribes the period
during which the bidder must accept properly tendered securities. Instead, the 15/10 busi-
ness day withdrawal requirement of rule 14d-7 prescribes the critical period since it effec-
tively fixes the date after which tendered securities may actually be purchased by the bidder.
18. See generally SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158 (Nov. 29, 1979), [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,587. While two courts had held
prior to the promulgation of rule 14d-5 that bidders had a right to subject company share-
holder lists, Applied Digital Data Sys. Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163, 1164
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910, 915 (N.D.
Tex. 1976), the right had been limited to situations in which the subject company, facilitated
by its exclusive possession of the list, had made false or misleading statements to sharehold-
ers. See, e.g., A&K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.
Wis. 1977). It was generally held that, absent such circumstances, no right to the list was
implicit in the Williams Act. See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 15 (1973).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-5 (1981). The subject company has the option to mail the bid-
der's tender offer materials if it does not wish to provide actual copies of its shareholder list
and security position listing to the bidder. Id § 14d-5(a). Most subject companies elect to
conduct the mailing.
20. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158 (Nov. 29, 1979), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,582-83 (footnote omitted).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1981).
22. A triggering public announcement under rule 14d-2(b) must disclose only (1) the
identity of bidder and the subject company; (2) a statement of the class and amount of
equity securities being sought; and (3) the price or range of prices being offered. Id
§ 240.14d-2(c).
The SEC's stated concern for security holder protection in adopting rule 14d-2(b) has
been challenged as a subterfuge for insuring the invalidation of state takeover laws. See,
e.g., Ohio v. SEC, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,688 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (complaint dismissed on justicibility grounds). Indeed, if prevention of trading based
upon a lack of full disclosure by the bidder had been the true aim of rule 14d-2(b), it would
be difficult to justify the. five business day hiatus between public announcement by the bid-
der and actual dissemination of tender offer materials permitted thereunder, the SEC staff's
position that public announcement of the material terms of a tender offer by any person
other than the bidder does not trigger rule 14d-2(b), SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
[Vol. 36
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ments of the state takeover laws. As the SEC recognized in adopting rule
14d-2(b), 23 the so-called "commence or withdraw" requirements of the
new rule made simultaneous compliance with the state-imposed waiting
period requirements literally impossible.24
Notwithstanding the fact that rule 14d-2(b) caused the only direct con-
flict between most state takeover statutes and the SEC's 1979 tender offer
rules, the substantial thrust of the case law after the promulgation of those
rules contravened the validity of the state laws. 25 Further, the bidder's
institution of litigation without prior warning (precluding the subject com-
pany from choosing a favorable forum in which to litigate the state law
issues) in order to obtain injunctive relief against the enforcement of state
takeover laws replaced the "bear hug" offer and its variants as the pre-
ferred tactic of bidders in dealing with the state takeover laws.26 Marathon
was no exception.27
No. 16,623 (Mar. 5, 1980), 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 24,2841, and the disparity in treat-
ment between tender offers and other forms of business combination transactions in which
prompt information dissemination is not required. See, e.g., Freund & Green, Substance
Over Form S-14:. A Proposal To Reform SEC Regulation of NegotiatedAcquisition, 36 Bus.
LAW. 1483 (1981).
23. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158 (Nov. 29, 1979), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED, SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,583-84.
24. Most states had required the bidder to make certain filings and notify the target
company of its intentions for substantial periods prior to actual commencement of the
tender offer. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page 1976) (20 calendar day pre-
offer filing and notification requirement). Thus, even as to state statutes having strong deci-
sions upholding their constitutional validity, e.g., AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp.
929 (S.D. Ohio 1979), the promulgation of rule 14d-2(b) necessarily resulted in holdings that
the state preoffer waiting period requirements were preempted. Compare id with Canadian
Pac. Enters. (U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
25. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); MITE Corp. v.
Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), afl'dsub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 73
L. Ed. 2d 269 (1982). But see Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 50 U.S.L.W. 3998.18 (U.S.
June 28, 1982), vacating and remanding 121 N.H. 607, 443 A.2d 1250 (1981) (judgment va-
cated in light of MITE decision); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,238 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). Ironically, the Supreme Court's decision
in MITE was based upon commerce clause grounds only because the case arose prior to the
effectiveness of rule 14d-2(b). See supra note 1.
26. "Bear hugs," commonly employed by bidders during the 1970s, were firm takeover
offers, usually at substantial premiums over market, addressed to the subject company's di-
rectors, which were designed in part to avoid the state takeover laws by forcing public dis-
closure and thereby acceptance of the offer by the subject company. See, e.g., A.
FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 58 (1981); 1 M. LIP-
TON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 111-15 (Supp. 1979).
27. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 1262 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 1981). Although
Mobil obtained injunctive relief in four other actions challenging the takeover laws of states
having tangential contacts with Marathon or its business and assets, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Ohio refused to grant a temporary restraining order
against the invocation of the Ohio Takeover Act, which clearly applied to Mobil's bid, since
Marathon was organized under Ohio law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page
Supp. 1981). The court reasoned:
The Ohio takeover statutes are entitled to presumptive validity. The Court
believes that the decision concerning whether or not to grant injunctive relief
respecting applicable state requirements can be properly made only after a
hearing followed by thoughtful decision with findings of fact and conclusions
of law concerning each of the relevant statutory components of the Act. Noth-
ing in plaintiffs filings and nothing I have heard from counsel has convinced
me that justice requires otherwise.
1982]
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Rule 14d-2(b) and the demise of the state takeover laws operated in tan-
dem to rekindle the "Saturday Night Special" tactic, which involved sur-
prise tender offers structured around the minimum time frames legally
permissible and offered at bargain prices because of the attendant decrease
in the probability of competitive bidding. 28 At least some of these consid-
erations probably affected Mobil's selection of tactics in its initial bid for
control of Marathon. Other features of the SEC's 1979 tender offer rules
also influenced Mobil's tactical choices.
2 Proration and Front-End Loading. The SEC's 1979 tender offer rules
contain an apparent oversight. Although rule 14e-1 creates a twenty busi-
ness day minimum offering period and rule 14d-7 creates a fifteen business
day minimum withdrawal rights period, takeover bids comprised of part
cash and part securities can still be structured, as in Marathon, in order to
take advantage of the ten calendar day minimum proration period of sec-
tion 14(d)(6).29 The purpose of these takeover bids is to pressure target
shareholders into tendering within the ten calendar day proration period
to ensure that they will receive cash for at least a portion of their shares.
30
The pressure to tender during this period is particularly great when (1) the
second-step, clean-up transaction contemplates securities of an undetermi-
nable or clearly lower value; (2) substantial arbitrage activity is expected
because of the practical advantages possessed by arbitrageurs and profes-
sional investors;31 or (3) competitive bidding is likely to occur.32
Thus, front-end loading, bids in which the tender offer price is higher
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 1262 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 1981) (interim order).
28. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 26, at 11. The Ohio Takeover Act's
60-day administrative review period preserved in AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Siipp.
929 (S.D. Ohio 1979), not only afforded the target company the opportunity to challenge the
disclosures in the initial bidder's proposed tender offer materials, but also gave the target
company the time to locate a more favorable bidder, or "White Knight," offering almost
$100 million more than the initial bid. See Bendix Corp. Supplement To Offer To Purchase
2 (Dec. 17, 1979).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976). Section 14(d)(6) requires that shares tendered within
the first ten calendar days of a partial tender offer be purchased pro rata if more shares are
tendered than the bidder is willing to purchase.
30. See, e.g., Lederman & Vlakahis, Pricing and Proration in Tender Offers, 14 REV.
SEC. REG. 813, 818 n.28 (1982). The SEC's oversight probably resulted from the fact that
the 1979 tender offer rules contemplated the "any or all" cash tender offer, which
predominated during the immediately preceding period. Part cash, part stock offers can be
attractive in the current economic environment given the present high interest rates and
relative unattractiveness of the public securities markets to potential issuers. Gun-jumping
problems under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976), have been effec-
tively eliminated by an administrative interpretation of the SEC staff that purports to har-
monize the requirements of that statute and the Williams Act. See SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 14,699 (Apr. 24, 1978), 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,284H.
31. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,761 (May 25, 1982), [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,222 (proposing rule 14d-8, which would
require pro rata acceptance of all shares properly tendered); SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 18,050 (Aug. 21, 1981), [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,019 (proposed revision of rule 10b-4 to proscribe "hedged tendering").
32. In a competitive bidding situation the cash portion can be increased and the paper
portion left at the initial level or only slightly increased as in Mobil's counter-bids for Co-
noco, Inc. in 1981.
[Vol. 36
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than the price contemplated by the squeeze-out merger, can be said to un-
dermine the fifteen and twenty business day periods of rules 14d-7 and
14e-l(a), and the tactic is designed to pressure target shareholders into
tendering early. Nothing in the SEC's rules, however, at least as presently
constituted, 33 prohibits the practice. Further, in Radol v. Thomas,34 the
consolidated shareholders' litigation seeking to enjoin the U.S. Steel-
Marathon merger, Judge Rubin held that front-end loading was not ma-
nipulative under section 14(e) or rule lb-5 35 in light of the implicit recog-
nition of such transactions in the SEC's rules36 and of the evidence
adduced in the hearing on plaintiffs motion to enjoin the merger "that the
overwhelming response to U.S. Steel's tender offer was due, not to the co-
erciveness alleged to be inherent in a two-tier pricing structure, but be-
cause of the relatively attractive price offered at both ends of the
transaction. '37 However, absent Mobil's initial bid for Marathon (some
fifty percent less than U.S. Steel's counterbid), predicting whether the out-
come in Radol would have been different is impossible.
Not only had target companies such as Marathon effectively lost the
protections of the state takeover statutes and the relative luxury of time
they had afforded, but also many target company shareholders, particu-
larly nonprofessional investors, had to confront the decision of whether or
not to tender within the short time period of section 14(d)(6). One unre-
lated factor, which is not susceptible to substantiation by case or rule cita-
tions, but is nonetheless significant to an analysis of the offensive setting
prior to Marathon is the clearly perceptible shift in antitrust enforcement
attitudes that accompanied the current Administration into office.
3. Shift in Antitrust Enforcement Attitude in Washington. The notification
and regular review procedures of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 197638 have greatly aided the subject company in efforts
to persuade the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Com-
mission to consider challenging takeover bids on antitrust grounds, partic-
ularly those attempts delayed due to the operation of state takeover laws.
However, given the relatively lax antitrust enforcement attitudes of the
33. The SEC's proposed rule 14d-8, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,761
(May 25, 1982), [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,222, if adopted,
will alleviate some of the pressure by requiring proration with respect to all shares tendered
during the period of a tender offer. Some front-end loading would probably remain since
the practice can still reduce the overall cost of an acquisition and because, as a practical
matter, not all target stockholders (e.g., some nonprofessional investors) will accept any
tender offer.
34. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,693 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
36. Rule 13e-3 provides an exception from the SEC's going-private disclosure rules for
second-step transactions consummated within a year of a tender offer provided that target
shareholders receive equal consideration in the second step. Id § 240.13e-3. "Rule 13e-3
thus, by negative implication, acknowledges that such transactions occur and purports to
regulate the second step of such two-tier transactions." Radol v. Thomas, [Current Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,693, at 93,460 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
37. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,693, at 93,460.
38. 15 US.C. §§ 1, 8, 15c, 18a, 1311 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
1982]
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current Administration 39 and the reality of the DOJ's actions, or inactions
in, for example, the 1981 attempted takeover of Grumman Corporation,
40
efforts actively to engage the regulatory agencies in Washington clearly
became a secondary antitrust strategy to the preferred approach of private
litigation in the hustings.
The shift in governmental antitrust enforcement attitudes in Washington
also played a significant role in Marathon; it is unlikely that Mobil's offer
would have been attempted without the shift.41 Before that litigation can
be analyzed directly, however, the principal pre-Marathon development on
defense should be briefly considered. That development marked the
evolution of the target company's duties to resist an inadequate or illegal
takeover bid.
B. On Defense
1. Defensive Strategies Generally. A successful tender offer defense based
upon alleged securities law violations depends in part upon the current
events in the securities law field,42 amendments to the SEC's Williams Act
rules,43 and various factual issues such as disclosure of regulatory impedi-
ments to the offer,44 pending litigation, 45 possible conflicts of interest,
46
bidder access to inside information, 47 and plans and purpose disclosure.
48
Prevalent substantive defense strategies include the invocation of state
takeover statutes that, at least prior to Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,49 withstood
constitutional attack,50 "scorched earth,"'" procurement of a "White
39. See U.S. Dep't of Justice and FTC Merger Guidelines-1982, [Extra Edition, June
16, 1982] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9-54 (June 14, 1982). See generally Baker, Justice Dept.
Merger Guidelines Contribute a Dose of Rationality, Nat'l L.J., June 28, 1982, at 16, col. i.
40. Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 665 F.2d 10 (2d
Cir. 1981).
41. For example, Exxon Corporation's tender offer for Reliance Electric Company in
1979 was challenged by the Federal Trade Commission based upon the "potential entrant"
theory. Reliance Electric Co. Proxy Statement 10-13 (Nov. 28, 1979). Prior to the current
Administration, no major oil company had attempted a non-negotiated takeover of another
fully integrated oil company.
42. See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (litigation
relating to questionable payments).
43. See, e.g., Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding, N.V., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,356 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981) (litigation relating to disclosure of
bidder's financial statements); Gray Drug Stores, Inc. v. Simmons, 522 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.
Ohio 1981) (litigation relating to meaning of "bidder").
44. See Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin A.G., No. 785-73 (D.N.J. July 3, 1973), afl'dper
curiam, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
45. See SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
46. See Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
47. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969)
(rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 456 F. Supp.
484, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also General Portland Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee S.A., No.
CA-3-81-1060-D (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 1981).
48. See Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. C82-959 (N.D. Ohio
June 11, 1982).
49. See supra note i.
50. See AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
51. See In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. 041-15 (Ohio Div. of Secs. Oct. 9, 1978).
"Scorched earth" defenses involve threatened sales of target company assets, extraordinary
[Vol. 36
TENDER OFFER MANIPULA4TION
Knight,"52 and, most importantly, antitrust litigation. 3
No fundamentally new defensive strategies predated Marathon. A gen-
eral refinement of the White Knight approach (the "lock-up" techniques at
issue in the case) and considerable administrative and decisional law on
the federal and state duties of subject companies and their directors in the
context of unsolicited takeover bids had emerged prior to Marathon.
These developments, coupled with the SEC's inadvertent reincarnation of
the Saturday Night Special approach to structuring takeover bids, required
subject companies and their directors to make major strategic decisions in
short time periods and to be prepared to make full disclosure to the public
in order to justify their actions. These new disclosure requirements are
considered first.
2 New Subject Company Disclosure Requirements. Prior to the promul-
gation of the SEC's 1979 tender offer rules, the Williams Act had been
construed not to impose any obligation on the subject company to respond
to a tender offer.54 Subject companies did, of course, frequently publish
press releases and advertisements with respect to takeover bids, and to that
extent were subject to the filing requirements of rule 14d-955 and the gen-
eral antifraud provisions of section 14(e).56 In fact, subject company man-
agement had been held to a stricter standard of disclosure than the bidder
because of state law fiduciary obligations and, at least with respect to some
issues, the subject company's relatively greater access to information about
itself and its plans.5 7
The SEC's 1979 amendments include a wholesale revision of schedule
14D-9 (formerly denominated schedule 14D), the subject company's basic
SEC disclosure form.58 The amendments include the adoption of rule 14e-
2(a), 59 which requires that the subject company publish a statement dis-
dividends by the target, and similar practices designed to make the target less attractive to an
unwanted bidder.
52. "White Knights" are companies by which an initial target company agrees to be
acquired to defeat an unwelcomed bidder, usually on terms providing substantially greater
returns to target company shareholders. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1982, at 3, col. 2
(reporting agreement in principle between Allied Corporation and The Bendix Corporation
ending Martin-Marietta Corporation's takeover bid for Bendix).
53. See generally A. FLEISCHER, supra note 26, at 119-55.
54. See, e.g., A&K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636, 644
(E.D. Wis. 1977); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 79-80 (1977).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1981). Subject companies were not required to file under
rule 14d-9 with respect to "stop-look-and-listen" communications. Id
56. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 874-75 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Alaska Interstate
Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
57. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 484, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1328-29 (W.D. Mich. 1978). See generally
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 364-65 (2d Cir.) ("Corporate
insiders therefore have a special responsibility to be meticulous and precise in their repre-
sentations to shareholders."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1981).
59. Id § 240.14e-2(a). Rule 14d-9(a), id § 240.14d-9(a), requires the filing of a sched-
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closing whether it recommends acceptance or rejection of the offer,
whether it is remaining neutral with respect to the offer, or whether it is
unable to take a position with respect to the offer. Item 4(b) of schedule
14D-9 now requires disclosure of the "reason(s) for the position (including
the inability to take a position) stated." The instruction pursuant to item
4(b) expressly states: "Conclusory statements such as 'The tender offer is
in the best interest of the shareholders,' will not be considered sufficient
disclosure .. ".. -6 Moreover, consistent with the SEC's general bias
against defensive actions by target companies, 6' item 7 of schedule 14D-9
requires disclosure of "whether or not any negotiation is being undertaken
or is underway by the subject company in response to the tender offer"
relating to, inter alia, "[a]n extraordinary transaction such as a merger or
reorganization, involving the subject company."'62 Subject company dis-
closures in response to these requirements have generally become very de-
tailed and, although hard data is not available, the disclosure requirement
has probably had a chilling effect on certain possible defensive responses
to unsolicited takeover bids. At the same time state law imposed an af-
firmative duty upon target management to resist certain takeover bids, and
practical realities required that the decision to determine a course of action
be made within a very short time period.
3. The Evolution of State Law Fiduciary Obligations in Opposing Unsolic-
ited Takeover Bids. It can be argued that tender offers constitute mere
purchases and sales of securities of the target company in which the com-
pany and its management are not implicated. 63 Although from humble
beginnings,64 by the time Marathon was in the courts, the law had evolved
that subject companies and their directors not only had the right, but had
an affirmative duty to oppose takeover bids that would harm the corporate
enterprise or that were inadequate from a financial point of view.65 Fur-
ther, in an appropriate case that duty included an "affirmative [obligation]
ule 14D-9 with the SEC, with the exchange on which the subject company's equity securities
are listed (or NASDAQ if such securities are traded over the counter), and with the bidder
as soon as practicable on the date that any subject company solicitation or recommendation
is first published, sent, or given to shareholders. Statements published pursuant to rule 14e-
2(a) constitute solicitations or recommendations under rule 14d-9(a). Thus, schedule 14D-9
filings are now required for all tender offers subject to the Williams Act.
60. Id § 240.14d-101. Prior to the adoption of schedule 14D-9 the SEC staff frequently
commented upon the subject company's statement (or lack thereof) of reasons for a particu-
lar recommendation in schedule 14D filings. In practice that procedure rarely produced
additional disclosures.
61. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,230 (Oct. 13, 1978), [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,748 (setting forth SEC staff's views on re-
quired proxy statement disclosures in connection with shareholder approval of defensive
measures).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1981).
63. See generally Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 73 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1982).
64. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. In. 1969)
("[M]anagement has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detri-
mental to the company or its stockholders.").
65. See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); see also Panter v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981); Treadway
Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
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not to refrain from bringing actions" to stop an illegal tender offer. 66
A corollary to the affirmative duty to oppose an inadequate or illegal
tender offer states that actions taken in fulfillment of that duty will be pre-
sumed to be valid and protected by the business judgment rule.67 The
business judgment rule should apply in this context even if it can be shown
that one of the purposes for a defensive action is the retention of manage-
ment in office because, "if any rational business purpose can be attributed
to [management's] decision," it will not be second-guessed by the courts. 68
Only if the sole or primary purpose of a particular action is personally
motivated will management bear the burden of proving that the transac-
tion is intrinsically fair. As recently stated by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit: "[Ilf actions are arguably taken for the benefit of the corpo-
ration, then the directors are presumed to have been exercising their sound
business judgment rather than responding to any personal motivations. '69
Five significant decisions that applied the business judgment rule to the
sale or granting of options to sell stock or assets predated Marathon. The
most recent of these decisions, Conoco, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,70 was strik-
ingly similar to Marathon. Mobil, vying with E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. to gain control of Conoco, sought a temporary restraining order
against duPont's competing tender offer based upon a claim that a stock
option entered into by Conoco and duPont constituted a breach of fiduci-
ary duty and a waste of corporate assets by Conoco's directors. Judge
Pierce, however, denied Mobil's application after reviewing the grant of
the stock option under the business judgment rule. Since the option was
presumed to be valid under the rule's application, Mobil was unable to
rebut that presumption and to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.7 '
In two recent cases involving contests for control, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reached similar results in considering the sale of blocks
of stock accompanying the signing of merger agreements. In Crouse-Hinds
Co. v. InterNorth, Inc. 72 the Second Circuit reversed a trial court order
granting the defendant bidder an injunction to halt the exchange of a
block of target company stock for stock of a third company with which the
Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980); Conoco, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 4787 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 1981); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 6155 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1981).
66. Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
67. See, e.g., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 1980)
("The starting point for analysis of an attack by a shareholder on a transaction of the corpo-
ration is the business judgment rule.").
68. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (emphasis added); see also
Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,483,
at 92,833-34 (N.D. Ill.), af'd mem., Nos. 1305 & 1307 (7th Cir. March 5, 1982). But see
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,375 (S.D. Ohio) (putting burden of proof on defendant directors), rev'd on other grounds,
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
69. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981).
70. No. 4787 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1981).
71. Id at 11.
72. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
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target had agreed to merge. The court acknowledged "the prudent recog-
nition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate
what are and must be essentially business judgments. ' 73 Based upon simi-
lar reasoning, in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp. 74 the Second Circuit re-
versed an order enjoining the voting of a block of the target company's
stock that had been sold to the target's chosen merger partner. 75
In GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc. 76 the Delaware Chancery Court
denied a tender offeror's motion for a restraining order to enjoin the sale of
a target's "prize asset." Plaintiff GM Sub charged that defendant Liggett's
directors had breached their fiduciary duties, because they had approved
the sale of Liggett's wholly owned subsidiary, Austin, Nichols & Co., Inc.,
to a French company for the purpose of thwarting GM Sub's tender offer
and thereby maintaining Liggett's incumbent management. Noting that
GM Sub had not withdrawn its offer despite the prospective sale of Lig-
gett's "prize asset" and that the sale of the asset did not guarantee that
control of Liggett would not change hands, 77 Chancellor Brown found that
GM Sub had failed to demonstrate that it was likely to succeed in proving
the sale was designed to perpetuate control rather than to allow Liggett's
shareholders to realize fair value for their shares of Austin, Nichols & Co.,
Inc.78 Finally, in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 79 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that a subject company's board of directors had
acted properly and within the protection of the business judgment rule
when it authorized corporate actions in opposition to a tender offer that it
determined to be financially inadequate. Those actions included the insti-
tution of antitrust litigation against the unwelcome suitor and engagement
in "defensive acquisitions."80
While the SEC's 1979 tender offer rules and the attendant demise of the
state takeover laws emphasized surprise, short-fuse takeover bids, state
fiduciary obligations had been construed to impose upon target company
management a duty to resist an inadequate or illegal bid, and federal law
required meticulous disclosure of actions taken in fulfillment of that duty.
At the same time the state law business judgment rule had been deemed
applicable to protect management from potential liabilities arising out of
actions initiated in the takeover context. The stage was thus set for Mobil's
surprise bid for control of Marathon.
II. MARATHON
A. Factual Background
On October 30, 1981, Mobil announced its intention to make a cash
73. Id at 702.
74. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
75. Id at 382-83.
76. No. 6155 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1981).
77. Id at 4.
78. Id at 5.
79. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
80. 646 F.2d at 297.
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tender offer at $85 per share for approximately 51% of Marathon's out-
standing shares. A clean-up merger involving vaguely described Mobil de-
bentures valued, in the opinion of Mobil's investment banker, at $85 per
share would follow the cash tender offer. Mobil made a weekend distribu-
tion of the tender offer materials and an antitrust position paper to arbi-
trageurs and to other professional investors. Mobil did not, however,
actually disseminate its offer within the meaning of rule 14d-4 81 prior to
the commencement of litigation by Marathon that alleged violations of the
antitrust laws. Just before midnight on Sunday, November 1, 1981, the
Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio entered
a temporary restraining order based upon the antitrust allegations that
barred Mobil from taking any steps to implement its tender offer. 82 Fol-
lowing a five-day hearing, the district court issued a preliminary injunction
against the consummation of the tender offer. The injunction was subse-
quently affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 83
Notwithstanding the successes in its antitrust case against Mobil, on No-
vember 18, 1981, Marathon entered into an acquisition agreement with
U.S. Steel that provided for a cash tender offer at $125 per share, almost
50% more than the price offered by Mobil, for approximately 51% of Mar-
athon's shares to be followed by a clean-up merger involving U.S. Steel
debentures with a face value of $100 per share. At the request of and to
induce U.S. Steel to make its competing bid,84 Marathon granted two op-
tions to its White Knight. The first option was for slightly less than the
18/2% New York Stock Exchange threshhold for nonstockholder approved
issuances of stock 85 immediately exercisable at $90 per share. At that time
this amount approximated the present value of the paper portion of U.S.
Steel's offer and was $5 per share more than Mobil's initial bid. The sec-
ond option related to Marathon's "crown jewel," a 48% producing interest
in the Yates Field in west Texas. The Yates Field option was exercisable
at $2.8 billion, but only in the event that a third party gained control of
Marathon.
Mobil sued in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio86 to
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1981). Rule 14d-4 provides three alternative methods for
disseminating a tender offer: (1) long-form publication of the entire offer in a newspaper of
national circulation; (2) summary publication of an advertisement in such a newspaper an-
nouncing the tender offer (with an undertaking promptly to furnish copies of the offer to
shareholders); and (3) mailing the offer to target shareholders under the provisions of rule
14d-5 relating to the target's shareholder list and security position listing.
82. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., No. C81-2193 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 1982) (interim
order).
83. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), afl'd, 669 F.2d 379
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982).
84. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,375, at 92,281 (S.D. Ohio), rey'don other grounds, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
Such options are normally referred to as "lock ups" because they are designed in part to
discourage competing bidders from making offers for the target company, thus "locking up"
the target company.
85. NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-284 (1978).
86. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had no meaningful nexus to the
transactions at issue. The judges of that court were, however, generally familiar with con-
tested tender offers because of the relatively large number of cases involving the Ohio Take-
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invalidate the options and then increased the cash portion of its original
offer to Marathon to $1 per share more than the cash portion of U.S.
Steel's offer. Mobil advanced four theories: (1) that the options were ma-
nipulative under section 14(e) and that adequate disclosure had not been
made with respect to them;87 (2) that the granting of the options consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duties by Marathon's directors;88 (3) that the
Yates Field option involved a sale of "substantially all" of Marathon's as-
sets, thus requiring stockholder approval under state law,8 9 since the Yates
Field was clearly Marathon's most important asset;90 and (4) that the op-
tions were ultra vires. 9' Mobil apparently overlooked the argument
(which has yet to be tested elsewhere) that the asset and stock options were
an integral part of the proposed merger and therefore could not be exer-
cised unless approved by stockholders.92
B The District Court Decision
The thrust of Mobil's presentation to the trial court was its allegation
that the Marathon directors had breached their fiduciary obligations in
granting the options. With respect to this issue, Judge Kinneary wrongly
(in view of the decisions cited by him93) imposed the burden of proof on
Marathon's directors, thus eschewing the business judgment rule on the
facts sub judice:
Where the consummation of a proposed business combination carries
with it the anticipation of perpetuating the control of the directors, a
personal interest sufficient to shift the burden of proof is shown ...
[S]elf-interest need not be the sole motivation of an act in order to
cause a shift in the burden of proof.94
Despite wrongfully allocating the burden of proof, Judge Kinneary found
that the Marathon directors had affirmatively shown that the exercise price
under each option was fair to Marathon's shareholders and that the grant
over Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1981), and were known not
to have the predispositions of some districts to avoid judicial intervention in such
controversies.
87. Complaint, supra note 6, 24-29. The disclosure argument was never fully devel-
oped at trial, probably in light of the established principle that nothing in the federal securi-
ties laws requires disclosures of disparaging or speculative characterizations; rather, all that
is required to be disclosed are the basic facts that permit the reader to draw informed con-
clusions. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 658 (1981); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 873 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Conoco, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 81-4787 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 1981).
88. Complaint, supra note 6, T 30-33.
89. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (Page 1978).
90. Complaint, supra note 6, $ 34-39.
91. Id 40-47.
92. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.79 (Page Supp. 1981).
93. E.g., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
94. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,375, at 92,284-85 (S.D. Ohio) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 669
F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
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of the options was for a good-faith business purpose. 95 Accordingly, Judge
Kinneary held that "Mobil has failed to demonstrate any likelihood or
probability of success on the merits" on its fiduciary duty claim. 96
With respect to Mobil's manipulation theory, Judge Kinneary
concluded:
The Court agrees with defendants that Mobil's claim as to the
purpose and effect of the merger and option agreements amounts to
no more than a claim that the Marathon directors acted unfairly and
breached their fiduciary [duties] to Marathon and its shareholders.
Such an allegation does not state a cause of action under Section
14(e).97
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green98 the Supreme Court had held that
deception or misrepresentation is a prerequisite for rule 1Ob-5 liability.99
Accordingly, Judge Kinneary was "constrained to conclude" that the sec-
tion 14(e) allegations presented "no, much less a strong or substantial, like-
lihood or probability of prevailing" on the merits. 1o Mobil then appealed
Judge Kinneary's ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
C The Appellate Court Decision
In light of Judge Kinneary's strong factual findings with respect to the
state law claims, Mobil switched its emphasis on appeal to its manipula-
tion theory under section 14(e). In essence, Mobil argued that the "District
Court erred in ruling that the 'lock-up' agreements did not violate section
14(e) . . . [because those] agreements have prevented a public auction of
Marathon stock, thus depriving Marathon shareholders of hundreds of
95. The Court has found that the Yates Field option price of $2.8 billion was not
unreasonable. Further, the stock option price of $90 per share was higher
than both the then-current trading price of Marathon shares and the tender
offer price of Mobil at $85 when this option was given to [U.S. Steel's acquisi-
tion subsidiary]. The Court must conclude that both options were fair with
respect to their valuation.
The Court also finds that defendants had a reasonable corporate purpose in
granting the options. That purpose was to obtain the best possible deal for
Marathon shareholders in the face of an inevitable takeover .... The record
is replete with evidence that the directors thoroughly reviewed the alternatives
open to them, diligently investigated the relevant facts, and relied upon the
advice of competent professional advisors before accepting the agreements. In
sum, the Court concludes from the evidence before it that the defendant direc-
tors have borne their burden of showing fairness, corporate purpose, and good
faith.
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,285.
96. Id (emphasis added).
97. Id at 92,281.
98. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
99. Except for their respective "in connection with" clauses, rule lob-5 and section 14(e)
are substantively identical. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 605
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,142, at 96,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af d, 622 F.2d 572
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); In re Sunshine Mining Co. v. Securities Litig.,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,217, at 96,635-36 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
100. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,282.
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millions of premium dollars for their shares."' 0 ' Based upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Green '0 2 and upon Judge Kinneary's decision, the Mar-
athon directors argued that "misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an essen-
tial element of a cause of action under Section 14(e)," 1o3 and that the trial
court's factual finding that the challenged options were fair and for a good
faith business purpose under state law precluded a finding that the Wil-
liams Act had been violated."°4 The issue was thus joined on appeal.
The appellate court did not disturb Judge Kinneary's rulings with re-
spect to the fiduciary duty claims.' 0 5 Nonetheless, it concluded that "the
Yates Field option and the stock option individually and together are 'ma-
nipulative' as that term is used in section 14(e)."' 1 6 The court reasoned:
In our view, it is difficult to conceive of a more effective and manipu-
lative device than the "lock-up" options employed here, options
which not only artificially affect, but for all practical purposes com-
pletely block, normal healthy market activity and, in fact, could be
construed as expressly designed solely for that purpose.10 7
The appellate court then analyzed each option individually. With respect
to the stock option, the Marathon court concluded that its existence "pre-
vents all others from competing on a par . . . for control of Marathon
[and] serve[s] as an artificial and significant deterrent to competitive bid-
ding." ' 0 8 The Yates Field option was also held to be manipulative because
"[o]thers cannot compete on a par with [U.S. Steel]; its bid of $125 per
share thus amounts to an artificial ceiling on the value Marathon share-
101. Brief of Appellant Mobil Corp. at 16-17, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d
366 (6th Cir. 1981). Somewhat ironically, this argument, while ultimately relied upon by the
appellate court, was founded on an inaccurate factual premise: Mobil was precluded from
proceeding with its tender offer because of the injunction against it in Marathon's antitrust
case, and no competing bidder other than U.S. Steel had emerged despite an exhaustive
White Knight search by Marathon. The failure to find a more favorable bidder was proba-
bly due to the size of the transaction and the fact that most other major oil companies would
face the same antitrust obstacles that Mobil had confronted. Accordingly, Judge Merritt
dissented from the Marathon appellate ruling, stating: "[In] my view... Mobil's Williams
Act case is moot in light of our disposition of the antitrust case." 669 F.2d at 378.
102. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
103. Brief of Appellees Marathon Oil Co. & Directors of Marathon Oil Co. at 25, Mobil
Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Appellees'
Brief] (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 510 F. Supp. 366, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
104. Even if Mobil's interpretation of the Williams Act were correct, Mobil can-
not prevail here because it has been found that the Marathon Directors have
satisfied the highest obligation imposed by law-that of fiduciaries-to the
very same persons-the Marathon shareholders--whom Mobil claims have
been defrauded and manipulated under the Williams Act. If the Marathon
Directors have satisfied the highest standard known to the law with respect to
the transactions at issue, there is no basis in either law or fact for claiming that
their conduct was fraudulent or manipulative under the Williams Act.
Appellees' Brief, supra note 103, at 3.




108. Id at 375.
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holders can receive for their shares.' 109
The Marathon court expressly rejected Judge Kinneary's holding that
the options could not be said to be manipulative under section 14(e) be-
cause they had not been accompanied by misrepresentation or deception:
It may be that the Marathon shareholders in this case have now been
fully informed that their management granted . .. the Yates Field
option and the stock option. They may now understand fully how
these options deter any tender offers higher than $125 per share. Yet,
they have had no real alternative to accepting the . . . offer, because
Mobil's offer of $126 is conditional upon the invalidity of the options,
and there is and could be no other comparable tender offer as long as
the "lock-up" options remain in effect. The artificial ceiling on the
price of their shares at $125 is manipulation to which they must sub-
mit whether it is disclosed to them or not, since in not tendering their
shares. . they risk being relegated to the "back end" of [U.S. Steel's]
takeover proposal and receiving only $90 per share.
In short, to find compliance with section 14(e) solely by the full
disclosure of a manipulative device as afait accompli would be to read
the "manipulative acts and practices" language completely out of the
Williams Act. "10
The appellate court, however, never confronted Marathon's argument,
which had clearly influenced the outcome in the trial court, that there
could be no manipulation under federal law if the court affirmatively
found that the challenged conduct satisfied the directors' fiduciary obliga-
tions to subject company shareholders."' Rather, the appellate court
merely noted that section 14(e) applied by its terms to "any person,"
thereby implicitly suggesting that U.S. Steel's demand and receipt of the
options were manipulative even if the Marathon directors' approval of
their grant may not have also been demanded." 2 Accordingly, the appel-
late court ordered "that the tender offer of [U.S. Steel] of $125 per share be
kept open for a reasonable time but free of the inhibiting and unlawful
impact of the two options which it extracted . . . as a condition of its
agreement."113
D. A Critique
Arguably, Marathon represents an impermissible extension of federal
law and a concomitant unjustifiable intrusion into state law. In introduc-
ing the bill that was ultimately enacted as the Williams Act, the bill's spon-
sor stated: "This legislation will close a significant gap in investor
protection under the Federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of
pertinent information to stockholders when persons seek to obtain control
of a corporation by a cash tender offer or through open market or privately
109. Id
110. Id at 376-77.
111. See supra text accompanying note 105.
112. 669 F.2d at 377. If the grant of the options was not manipulative under § 14(e), then




negotiated purchases of securities."' 14 Thus, the Williams Act is primarily
a disclosure statute enacted for the benefit of security holders and is not
intended to provide new substantive rights to either the bidder or the sub-
ject company: "The two major protagonists-the bidder and defending
management--do not need any additional protection. . . .They have the
resources and the arsenal of moves and countermoves which can ade-
quately protect their interests."' " 5
This factor principally led to the Supreme Court's conclusion in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 116 that a defeated bidder lacked standing to sue
for damages under section 14(e). The Court noted that "tender offerors
were not the intended beneficiaries" of the Williams Act. 1 7 While the
Piper Court was acutely aware that Congress did not intend to tip the bal-
ance in favor of the subject company or the bidder," 18 it reasoned that this
"express policy of neutrality scarcely suggests an intent to confer highly
important, new rights upon the class of participants whose activities
prompted the legislation in the first instance." '" 9
The Piper Court utilized the four-pronged test articulated in Cort v.
Ash ' 20 to analyze whether the inference of a private damage remedy under
section 14(e) was appropriate. While not literally applicable to questions
of whether, for example, a lock-up option or other defensive tactic violates
section 14(e), the Cori analysis nonetheless seems relevant, because both
issues relate to the ultimate scope and application of the Williams Act.
The Piper Court readily concluded that the first two Cori factors, whether
the plaintiff was a member of the "especial class" that the legislation was
designed to protect and whether congressional intent to confer a right ex-
isted, militated against the inference of an action for damages since bid-
ders were not the intended beneficiaries of the Williams Act.' 2' This
conclusion would, of course, equally apply to a lock-up option, a defensive
merger or, notwithstanding rule 14d-5, a request for the subject company's
shareholder list. The third Cort factor inquires whether the inference of
such a right would be consistent with the federal statutory scheme. The
Piper Court concluded that "the Williams Act cannot consistently be inter-
preted as conferring a monetary remedy upon regulated parties, particu-
larly where the award would not redound to the direct benefit of the
protected class."' 122 Arguably, any defensive tactic other than disclosure
that is undertaken to block an unsolicited offer (which was not the case in
Marathon since the challenged options were necessary to solicit a higher
114. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
115. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing & Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 257 (1967) (statement of Prof. Hayes), quoted in Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
116. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
117. Id at 28.
118. Id at 29.
119. Id. at 30.
120. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
121. 430 U.S. at 32 n.21.
122. Id at 39.
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bid) is inconsistent with the purposes of the Williams Act since, if effective,
it might perforce prevent the consummation of a tender offer.
The fourth factor under Cort addresses whether the cause of action is
one traditionally relegated to state law. Both in the Piper situation and in
the Marathon context, state law has traditionally controlled. Furthermore,
deference to state law was the principal policy consideration underlying
the Supreme Court's refusal in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 23 to ex-
tend rule lOb-5 to cover corporate conduct touching upon securities trans-
actions that did not involve deception or manipulation. The Green Court
stated that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are re-
luctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state
policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."'' 24 Instead, the
Court held that the word manipulation in rule lOb-5 is a term of art that
"refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting mar-
ket activity."'' 25 Although the Marathon court paid lip service to Green, it
ignored the latter's teaching that charges of corporate unfairness, absent
deception, are not actionable under the federal securities laws.
Of course, a target company may have to disclose accurately the objec-
tive facts relating to a defensive act such as a merger. 26 Given that section
14(e) merely makes rule lOb-5 applicable to tender offers, 127 arguably the
former should have no application in the absence of misrepresentation or
failure to disclose material facts, or manipulation within the narrow mean-
ing of Green. Judge Moore's dissent to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Green128 seems equally applicable in the tender offer
context:
The [Second Circuit] majority's insistence on extending the federal
securities anti-fraud provisions beyond the bounds of fraud and into
the realms of fiduciary duty is disturbing enough. Accompanied, as it
is, by their erroneous finding of a breach of such duty, and by the
astonishing and impermissible establishment of a federal common law
of corporations-as ill-founded as it is improper-disconcertion must
give way to alarm.
• . . First and foremost, however, the point must be made that, in
taking cognizance of plaintiffs' claim, the majority has not provided a
remedy to correct a fraud; rather it has extended to these plaintiffs an
123. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
124. Id at 479.
125. Id at 476. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976), the Supreme
Court held: "Use of the word 'manipulative' is especially significant. It is and was virtually
a term of art when used in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affect-
ing the price of securities."
126. See SEC v. Thermal Power Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,265 (D.D.C. 1975).
127. See supra note 99.
128. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1304-07 (2d Cir. 1976).
1982]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
independent, substantive right totally unrelated to the anti-fraud
scheme of the federal securities laws and in complete derogation of a
valid state rule regulating corporate activity. Indeed, the majority ap-
pears to have ignored the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1939),. . . which put an end to federal com-
mon law and forbade the federal courts from formulating their own
"better rule". 129
Perhaps the result in Marathon can be justified since, absent a federal
check, defensive actions by target management might as a practical matter
go unregulated because of the applicability of the business judgment rule
in actions predicated on state law. 130 Similar reasoning, however, was re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Green.' 3' Moreover, Judge Kinneary had
held in Marathon that the business judgment rule did not apply, as a mat-
ter of law, and that, as a matter of fact, the defendant directors had affirm-
atively proven that the grant of the options was for a good faith business
purpose and that the exercise price under each option was fair. Appar-
ently, given the state law duty to resist an inadequate or illegal tender of-
fer, actions undertaken in fulfillment of that duty should not be subject to
challenge under the Williams Act provided that full disclosure has been
made. 132
The Marathon manipulation theory could apply to virtually any tactic
designed to aid one side or the other in a takeover battle. To be sure, the
Marathon court noted that the stock option "was large enough in this take-
over contest to serve as an artificial and significant deterrent,"' 33 and Mar-
athon's interest in the Yates Field was described as "a very important
attraction to Mobil and other potential bidders for control of Mara-
129. Id at 1304, 1307 (footnote omitted).
130. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I emphatically disagree that the business judg-
ment rule should clothe directors, battling blindly to fend off a threat to their control, with
an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing over everything
but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion."), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 658 (1981).
131. See, e.g., Address of SEC Comm'r Sommer (Nov. 14, 1974), reprinted in [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010.
132. The question of whether a breach of state law fiduciary duties can be turned into a
disclosure violation (based upon a failure to disclose the alleged breach) has yet to be gener-
ally resolved under the federal securities laws. But see supra note 87. Compare Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), with Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). Federal and state concepts are not inherently exclusive, however,
even under the securities laws. For example, in State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,005 (2d Cir. 1981), the District Court for the Southern District of New York expressly
held that the business judgment rule generally governs decisions as to the timing of disclo-
sure to the investment community. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in rule
lOb-5 cases. E.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514,
518 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. deniedper curiam, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). Thus, the complete
divorce of federal and state concepts in Marathon appears to be inconsistent with other
developments under the federal securities laws.
133. Marathon, 669 F.2d at 375.
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thon."' 134 However, the Marathon court's underlying rationale that the
challenged options prevented all participants from "competing on a
par"135 has a much broader potential application. 36 While some Chicago-
school economists have argued for a legal theory that prohibits all defen-
sive actions other than mere disclosure,137 the pre-Marathon law, properly
so, was decidedly to the contrary.' 38 Nonetheless, Marathon remains the
law of the Sixth Circuit and, therefore, provides a basis for challenging
many defensive and offensive actions given the almost limitless jurisdic-
tion and venue provisions applicable to most nationwide tender offers. 139
Thus, the question becomes one of plumbing Marathon's conceptual
limits.
III. TACTICS AND STRATEGIES AFTER MARATHON
A. Defensive Actions
Marathon has received an indifferent reception outside the Sixth Circuit.
The first post-Marathon case involving a challenge to a defensive action
was Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar.'40 In that case the bidder, Whittaker Cor-
poration, sought to enjoin an asset sales agreement entered into by the
subject company, Brunswick Corporation. The agreement provided for
the swap of shares of Brunswick acquired pursuant to American's negoti-
ated tender offer in exchange for Brunswick's crown jewel, the Sherwood
Division. Judge Flaum, however, attempted to distinguish Marathon be-
cause Whittaker did not involve an option (even with the broad conditions
in the controlling documents, some of which had already been triggered),
and because the proposed sale of the crown jewel had not, in his view,
created an artificial ceiling in the tender offer market for the acquisition of
Brunswick. 14' Finally, Judge Flaum held that "[a] sale of a substantial
asset by a corporation in the face of a hostile tender offer standing alone is
not a violation of section 14(e)."1 42
Judge Flaum's efforts to distinguish Marathon do not withstand analy-
sis. Whether a proposed asset or stock transaction is structured as an op-
tion or as a binding agreement is seemingly irrelevant to an analysis of its
134. Id
135. Id
136. The Marathon theory has already been employed in the context of an 8.8% block of
stock (the stock option in Marathon was for slightly fewer than 18.5% of Marathon's shares).
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., No. C82-959 (N.D. Ohio June 11,
1982); see infra text accompanying notes 165-72.
137. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV, L. REV. 1 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive
Tactics and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981).
138. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
658 (1981); see also Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101
(1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's BoardroomAn Update After One Year, 36 Bus.
LAW. 1017 (1981).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
140. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,483 (N.D. I11.), affid
mem., Nos. 1305 & 1307 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982).
141. Id at 92,832.
142. Id
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effect on the tender offer market or to a determination that all participants
are prevented from "competing on a par" for control of the subject com-
pany.143 Of course, Judge Flaum correctly noted that cases before Mara-
thon had held that dispositions of assets and similar defensive measures,
by themselves, did not violate section 14(e).'4 Perhaps the true distin-
guishing feature between Whittaker and Marathon is that the asset trans-
action in the former case was with an unaffiliated third person, while the
asset option in Marathon was exercisable only in the event that another
company gained control of the subject company. Under the circum-
stances, the asset option would never come into play if the ultimate pur-
poses of the contracting parties were fulfilled. Still, the effect on bidders of
the asset agreements in both Whittaker and Marathon was analytically
identical, and the stock option in Marathon, held by itself to be manipula-
tive by the Sixth Circuit, was immediately exercisable. Accordingly, a
more plausible explanation of Whittaker is that it simply manifests Judge
Flaum's discomfort with Marathon's underlying rationale.
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn145 was more overtly inconsistent with
Marathon. Icahn, an approximately 30% holder (together with a section
13(d)(3) "group") 146 of the subject company, Marshall Field & Co., sued to
enjoin enforcement of a stock option exercisable at the initial cash tender
offer price (increased one day after the option was granted) of a two-step
White Knight agreement between Marshall Field and BATUS, Inc. and a
first-refusal right relating to Marshall Field's Chicago retail stores (its
crown jewel). Judge Level, however, refused the 30% holder's application
for relief against the allegedly lock-up options. While perfunctorily dis-
tinguishing Marathon (based principally upon a perceived failure to prove
irreparable harm, viz., that any potential bidder had been deferred by the
options), Judge Level's decision was ultimately grounded in a disagree-
ment with the Marathon court's analysis:
I doubt that [Marathon] represents the law in this circuit. In my view
the reasoning of that decision could unduly interfere with the right of
company management to combat a takeover attempt that it believes in
good faith to be harmful to its shareholders. In my view the securities
laws do not bar management from taking action in the best interests
of its shareholders even if this will make more difficult the success of a
disfavored offeror. The rule might be otherwise on a showing that
management is acting for its own interests in violation of its fiduciary
duty to its shareholders. No such showing has been made here.' 47
With respect to lock-up arrangements, stock options will probably be
upheld after Marathon if, as in the Icahn case, they are structured at the
143. Marathon, 669 F.2d at 375-77.
144. E.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Altman v. Knight, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,040 (S.D.N.Y.), amended, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Graphic Sci-
ences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1974); seesupra text
accompanying notes 67-80.
145. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1976).
147. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,616, at 93,061.
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best price being offered in the marketplace.1 48 Perhaps asset agreements
can be structured as binding contracts (Whittaker), or as first-refusal rights
(Icahn). While such structural approaches may be sufficient to bring the
subject agreements within Whittaker and Icahn,149 whether the facts in
either case constitute a basis for a principled distinction of Marathon is
unclear.
Whittaker and Icahn do indicate that Marathon may not find wide ac-
ceptance outside the Sixth Circuit, and courts within that circuit may at-
tempt to confine its application. Perhaps the most obvious judicial avenue
will be to limit Marathon to acts and transactions that have a major impact
upon the balance between competing bidders or the bidder and subject
company. Thus, the courts should normally permit previously upheld ac-
tions such as entering into long-term executive employment contracts,1 50
changing the composition of the subject company's board of directors,15'
increasing dividends,' 52 repurchasing stock, 153 or entering into defensive
litigation. 54 The ultimate effect of Marathon, however, on defensive ac-
tions such as corporate liquidations 55 or asset or stock transactions that do
not fit within the holdings of Whittaker or Icahn is presently impossible to
divine.
B. Marathon as the Predicate for Defensive Litigation
Although Marathon involved an action by a competing bidder, the deci-
sion presents very significant opportunities for litigation initiated by the
subject company that challenges actions by the bidder. Because of its em-
phasis upon the "effect on the market" of tender offer conduct, the impact
of Marathon in this setting has already been felt. 156 In the typical Williams
Act case injunctive relief is normally limited to an offer prohibiting future
purchases or a tender offer pending the filing and dissemination of an ac-
curate SEC disclosure document. 57 Exceptions to the normal rule exist,
148. The stock option in Marathon was priced at a level that approximated the then
present value of the securities offered in the second step of U.S. Steel's takeover offer. Price
escalator provisions (perhaps only up to specified price levels), while removing some of the
economic motivation for stock lock-ups, would enhance the likelihood of this result.
149. The Marathon court expressly disclaimed any intention to formulate a broad rule of
law applicable to all stock and asset options in this context, 669 F.2d at 374, thereby implic-
itly suggesting that some analogous actions may pass muster even in the Sixth Circuit.
150. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
151. See Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 112
(D.D.C. 1974).
152. See Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
153. See Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). But see Orbanco, Inc. v.
Security Bank, 371 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1974).
154. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
155. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.) (threatened
liquidation of target company enjoined).
156. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. C82-959 (N.D. Ohio June
11, 1982).
157. E.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980); Chromalloy
Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 249 (8th Cir. 1979); General Aircraft Corp. v.
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however, particularly when the defendant's conduct is willful or gives it a
significant advantage over the target or competing bidders. For example,
in General Steel Industries, Inc. v. Walco National Corp. 158 the District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ordered the rescission of shares
purchased by a bidder in open-market transactions prior to the commence-
ment of its tender offer under a schedule 13D filing that falsely represented
the open-market purchases as merely for investment purposes. The Gen-
eral Steel court reasoned:
(i) Walco's illegally obtained blocking position has placed it in a
position to inhibit competing offers and has made it extremely difficult
for GSI to arrange for a merger, business combination or to pursue
other possible business opportunities which would be favorable to all
GSI shareholders (as opposed to the 19 percent which Walco seeks).
Once Walco controls GSI, it will have little, if any, incentive to pay a
premium to the remaining GSI shareholders in a subsequent merger
of GSI and Walco. In addition, Walco's acquisition of over 51% of
GSI will reduce the liquidity of GSI stock held by the remaining GSI
shareholders.
(iii) Shareholders who sold to Walco irretrievably lost their ability
to obtain a control premium for their shares-a loss not compensable
by a monetary award-and unwittingly sacrificed their right to know-
ingly determine who should be in a position to control GSI. 159
Walco appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, but the case was settled prior to a decision by the appellate
court. While the appeal was pending, the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief
supporting the decision of the trial court, 160 the contents of which it de-
scribed as follows:
The Commission urged in its brief that the district court's equitable
jurisdiction to remedy Section 13(d) violations includes the authority
to order any relief appropriate under the circumstances. The Com-
mission expressed the view that equitable remedies in addition to cor-
rective disclosure, such as rescission and divestiture, may be necessary
or appropriate to remedy violations of the Williams Act, particularly
in cases where the defendant deliberately violated Section 13(d) and
the illegal conduct had permitted the defendant to obtain a sufficient
number of shares to inhibit competing tender offers or merger propos-
als. In such cases, absent rescission or divestiture or other remedy
removing the wrongfully obtained blocking position, shareholders
could be irreparably harmed and the defendant would be permitted to
benefit from its wrongful conduct. 161
Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 1977); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus.,
Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Avnet, Inc. v. Scope Indus., 499 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Brascan
Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
158. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,402 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
159. Id. at 92,418.
160. SEC Securities Litigation Release No. 9533 (Dec. 21, 1981), [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,387.
161. Id. at 92,344.
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General Steel did not represent a radical departure from prior law 162 given
that the relief ordered related only to shares purchased following the filing
of a false Williams Act disclosure document.
Marathon presents a fertile basis for extending the law well beyond the
result reached in cases such as General Steel precisely because the Mara-
thon court expressly rejected the contention that nondisclosure or decep-
tion is an essential element of section 14(e) manipulation. 63 In light of
Marathon's emphasis on whether the challenged conduct prevents other
tender offer participants from "competing on a par"' 164 for control of the
subject company, curative disclosure, the elixir usually proffered by a bid-
der found to have violated the Williams Act, will simply be irrelevant in
many cases.
This point was graphically illustrated in Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen
Energy Resources Ltd 165 In Hanna Mining the bidder, Norcen Energy
Resources Limited, had previously amassed through open-market
purchases an 8.8% block of stock of the target, The Hanna Mining Com-
pany, prior to making a schedule 13D filing in which it represented the
purpose of its purchases as mere investment. Five months later Norcen
publicly announced its intention to make a tender offer for control of
Hanna. On the date of the public announcement, Hanna obtained a tem-
porary restraining order based upon alleged violations of section 10(b),' 66
13(d), 14(e), and 20(a) 167 of the Securities Exchange Act. The gravamen of
Hanna's complaint was that Norcen had misrepresented the purpose of its
stock acquisitions in its schedule 13D filing to enable it initially to
purchase the 8.8% block 68 and to permit it to make its subsequent tender
162. See, e.g., Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1974)
(injunction against voting shares acquired in violation of § 13(d) for 5 years); rev'd on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin A.G., 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973)
(affirming preliminary injunction, inter alia, disenfranchising defendant who acquired
shares in violation of§ 14(e)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); Twin Fair, Inc. v. Reger, 394
F. Supp. 156, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) (preliminary injunction against, inter alia, voting any
shares acquired in violation of § 13(d)).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
164. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 378 (6th Cir. 1981).
165. No. C82-959 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
167. Id § 78t(a).
168. With respect to the schedule 13D issue, Hanna argued in the Sixth Circuit (the
appeal was dismissed on July 7, 1982, after settlement of the litigation between the parties):
[W]ithout its false statement of mere passive investment intent, Norcen would
have been unable to buy the 580,000-share block offered to it on October 28,
1981 in the first place because of the premerger notification requirements of
the [Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 18a, et seq. (1976) (the "H-S-R Act").] The filing and minimum 30-day
waiting period requirements of the H-S-R Act do not apply to acquisitions of
less than 10% of a company's stock if such acquisitions are solely for "invest-
ment" purposes. 16 C.F.R. § 802.9. Thus, in order to buy the block that gave
rise to its disclosure obligations under Section 13(d), Norcen had to lie about
its ultimate purpose. Judge Manos dismissed plaintiffs' separate claim under
the H-S-R Act on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert that
claim. Plaintiffs believe that such dismissal was erroneous, and have appealed
it. However, without respect to the outcome of the issue of whether plaintiffs
have standing to assert a claim under the H-S-R Act, the fact remains that
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offer at an artificially low price and with a minimum risk of competition.
Following a seven-day hearing, Judge Manos granted Hanna's motion
for a preliminary injunction. With respect to Hanna's section 13(d) claim,
Judge Manos essentially relied upon General Steel.' 69 With respect to the
evasion of the requirements of that Act (which defendants have never dis-
claimed) was undoubtedly one of the principal motives for the false statements
in Norcen's Schedule 13D.
Brief of Appellees The Hanna Mining Co., Carl E. Nickels, and John Gurgle at 16 n.17,
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. C82-959 (N.D. Ohio June 11,
1982).
Nonetheless, the Norcen defendants argued that the market purchases were not "in con-
nection with" a tender offer and therefore not actionable under § 14(e). Judge Manos found,
however:
Contrary to the defendants' contention that Norcen's intent to make a tender
offer for Hanna was formulated on the eve of the tender offer, this court finds
that the evidence establishes conclusively that Norcen contemplated such ac-
tion as early as the date on which it filed its Schedule 13D if not earlier.
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. C82-959, at 39 (N.D. Ohio June
11, 1982) (emphasis in original). In O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 529 F.
Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the argument that section 14(e) can apply only after public
announcement of a tender offer was expressly rejected. The O'Connor court upheld rule
14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981), which was promulgated under section 14(e), governing
insider trading on tender offer knowledge from the point at which "any person has taken a
substantial step or steps to commence. . . a tender offer." Going to the heart of the interests
that the Williams Act was intended to protect, the O'Connor court reasoned:
It is true that here the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred prior to the an-
nouncement of the tender offer proposal. However, this circumstance does not
change the fact that the alleged failure to disclose the impending announce-
ment of the tender offer proposal worked to deny the target invest[or] the rele-
vant information on which to decide whether to sell his shares in the same
manner as fraudulent conduct operates when an offer has already been pub-
lily announced.
529 F. Supp. at 1191. The O'Connor court concluded that any other reading would present
"the risk of 'defeating in substantial part the very purpose of the Act.'" Id. ; see also Lewis
v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), ("[I]njunctive relief... may be available [under
section 14(e)] to restrain or correct misleading statements made during the period preceding
a tender offer where it appears that such an offer is likely, and that reliance upon the state-
ments at issue is probable under the circumstances."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980);
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Applied Digital
Data Sys. Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1152, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 18, at 121-25; A. FLEISCHER, supra note 26, at 69-70.
In Hanna the trial court found that all of Norcen's activities were directed toward its
contemplated tender offer. The nexus, therefore, between the alleged fraud and the tender
offer was enough to fall within the broad substantive reach of the "in connection with"
requirement. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,
12-13 (1971) (interpreting "in connection with" language of rule lob-5 to reach "deceptive
practices touching [the] sale of securities"); Bolton v. Gramlich, [1981-1982 transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,438, at 92,593 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1982) ("In deciding whether
the harm to the [plaintiff] occurred in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the
Court declines to erect partitions around these closely connected transactions." (footnotes
omitted)).
169. Judge Manos concluded:
Similar to the irreparable harm found in [General Steel], this court finds that
the evidence establishes that: (1) by reason of its 8.8 percent interest, Norcen
has a competitive advantage over any other potential offeror for Hanna;
(2) once Norcen controlled Hanna, Norcen would have no incentive to pay a
premium to the remaining Hanna shareholders in the event of a subsequent
merger of the two companies and, therefore, the remaining shareholders
would possess an illiquid investment; and (3) the Hanna shareholders who
sold shares on the open market during the period Norcen's original Schedule
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Hanna plaintiffs' section 14(e) claim, Judge Manos found:
Here, the evidence establishes that Norcen's representation of an
investment intent in the acquisition of its 8.8 percent interest in Hanna
had an effect on the price of Hanna stock which the defendants' expert
conceded was trading [immediately prior to the tender offer an-
nouncement] at a price lower than it would have been had Norcen
disclosed its intent to acquire control. The effect Norcen's misrepre-
sentations had on the price for Hanna stock also made it appear that
the tender offer price of $45.00 per share, which Norcen announced
on April 5, 1982, was a substantial premium over what the evidence
establishes was a market price effected by "means unrelated to the
natural forces of supply or demand." [Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981).1 The evidence thus supports
the plaintiffs' contention that Norcen's repeated misrepresentations of
its intention to acquire control of Hanna and the [block purchase] of
Hanna stock on October 28, 1981 were manipulative violations of sec-
tion 10(b), Rule lOb-5 and section 14(e). 170
Relying upon the fact that the Sixth Circuit in Marathon had specifically
rejected the contention that misrepresentation or deception were essential
elements of section 14(e) manipulation,17' Judge Manos held that curative
disclosure was not enough to remedy the manipulation that had been
shown in the preliminary injunction hearing.' 72 Accordingly, Judge Ma-
13D was in effect irretrievably lost their ability to obtain a control premium, a
loss not compensable by a monetary award.
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. C82-959, at 42-43 (N.D. Ohio
June 11, 1982).
170. Id at 50.
171. Id at 49.
172. The defendants' third and final contention is that even if they engaged in a
manipulative scheme, the proper remedy is to eliminate the manipulation by
ordering corrective disclosure and then permit the tender offer to proceed. Al-
though the remedy urged by the defendants may be proper in some circum-
stances, it is utterly without merit in this case.
Although formulation of an appropriate remedy must await final hearing on
a permanent injunction, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs on their mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction supports the remedy of divestiture that they
request. The evidence establishes that by reason of the large block of stock
acquired by Norcen on October 28, 1981, Norcen has an advantage over any
other potential offeror for Hanna.
Indeed, if, as in this case, the evidence indicates a continuing fraud, divesti-
ture of the stock acquired in the transaction which gave rise to the statutory
duty violated in a false Schedule 13D filing seems as appropriate a remedy as
the divestiture ordered in General Steel Industries of the stock purchased after
the false Schedule 13D was filed. Any different result would mean that an
acquiring corporation could engage in the most deliberate form of misrepre-
sentation in its statutory filings and when its fraud is discovered merely file
corrective amendments and keep the benefits of its wrongful conduct regard-
less of how that conduct may continue to injure shareholders of the corpora-
tion whose stock it has acquired.
Id at 50-52. As in General Steel, the SEC submitted an amicus curiae brief in Hanna and
asserted that district courts have the power to grant injunctive relief that extends beyond
mere corrective disclosure:
To the extent . . . that defendants . . . suggest that the remedies available to
the district court were restricted to corrective disclosure as a matter of law, the
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nos issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Norcen defendants
from proceeding with their offer pending a trial on the merits unless the
8.8% block of Hanna stock was disposed of pursuant to a court-supervised
plan and other appropriate remedial steps were taken.
Without Marathon, whether the relief ordered in Hanna would have
been appropriate is doubtful. Even after General Steel (itself seemingly
influenced by the arguments advanced in Marathon), a finding of a viola-
tion of section 13(d) would not necessarily be sufficiently related to a pro-
posed tender offer to justify injunctive relief against the offer without the
"effect on the market" analysis that constitutes Marathon's theoretical un-
derpinning. Marathon formed the basis, however, for Judge Manos's em-
phasis in Hanna upon the effect of Norcen's prior disclosures on the
market (making the offered premium look substantial) and on the possibil-
ity of competitive bidding. Thus, the relief ordered in Hanna was
appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
After Marathon an inherent risk arises in the previously traditional tac-
tic of taking a position in a potential target company through open-market
purchases in order to average-down the cost of an entire acquisition. The
negotiated purchase of a large block of stock may also be vulnerable to
challenge if a reasonable nexus between the purchase and a Williams Act
violation or a subsequent takeover bid can be established. On the other
hand, Marathon provides the basis for challenging many traditional defen-
sive reactions. Thus, Marathon, in the context of the demise of state take-
over legislation, the SEC's 1979 tender offer rules, and the subject
company's affirmative duty to resist an inadequate or illegal takeover bid,
may well portend an era of surprise offers with the toe-to-toe battles being
fought out in the courts. Not at all clear, however, is whether shareholder
interests will necessarily be served by this conduct.
Commission disagrees. There is an important distinction between thepropri-
ety of, and thepower to grant, equitable relief, and, in this suit based on Wil-
hams Act violations, the district court had broad equitable powers.
Regardless of whether the relief granted here was appropriate under all the
circumstances, that equitable remedy was, in the Commission's view, one of
the "variety of tools," in addition to corrective disclosure, which the court had
thepower to order.
Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, at 22 (emphasis in original), Hanna Mining Co.
v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. 3386 (6th Cir.), dismissed by stiulation, No. 3386 (6th
Cir. July 7, 1982).
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